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Abstract  
High-technology firms per se are perceived to be more risky than other, more conventional, firms. It 
follows that financial institutions will take this into account when designing loan contracts, and that this 
will manifest itself in more costly debt. In this paper we empirically test whether the provision of a 
government loan guarantee fundamentally changes the way lenders price debt to high-tech firms. Further, 
we also examine whether there are differential loan price effects of a public guarantee depending on the 
nature of the firms themselves and the nature of the economic and innovation environment that 
surrounds them. Using a large UK dataset of 29,266 guarantee backed loans we find that there is a high-
tech risk premium which is justified by higher default, but, in general, that this premium is altered 
significantly when a public guarantee is provided for all firms. Further, all these loan price effects differ 
on precise spatial economic and innovation attributes.  
Keywords: cost of debt, high-tech firms, public loan guarantee scheme, loan default  
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1. Introduction 
 
Whilst there are clear economic benefits from innovation and technological advancement (Laeven 
et al., 2015), innovation processes are highly uncertain in their outcomes (Jalonen, 2012; Scherer et al., 
2001). This means that financiers will view funding projects associated with these efforts with caution. 
As small firms in general face a penalty due to their smallness per se, associated with the relatively high 
fixed costs of lending (and of providing equity) and asymmetric information problems, being innovative 
and technologically driven adds a further layer of asymmetry and informational opacity (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002; Guiso, 1998; Hall, 2002; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto, 2008). In short, the 
literature predicts that in debt markets, smaller firms already face general access problems and pay a 
premium on borrowing – but these problems may be worse for high-technology firms (Berger et al., 
2007; Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
Whilst governments have intervened in this small business finance space explicitly to correct for 
perceived market failures, or gaps in provision, in many ways, including loan guarantee schemes (Cowling, 
2010;  Honohan, 2010; Ughetto et al., 2017), R&D tax credits (Cowling, 2016), grants, soft loans, hybrid 
equity schemes (Aernoudt, 2005; Cannone and Ughetto, 2014), and business angel schemes (Ramadani, 
2009), the general approach to the financing of innovative and technology based firms has favored equity 
funding and intervention in equity capital markets (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Langeland, 2007). This has 
largely ignored the potential role that debt (Kerr and Nanda, 2014) and particularly loan guarantees might 
play in the funding of technology based firms. This is interesting in itself as the purpose of a public loan 
guarantee is to reduce the (default) risk to the lender of providing a loan to an informationally opaque 
smaller business (Honohan, 2010). In fact, the numerous loan guarantee programs introduced around 
the world have been conceived to allow lenders to share with the government the risk of default on 
outstanding loans, with the latter partially or totally covering any potential loss (Beck et al., 2010; Boschi 
et al., 2014; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Honohan, 2010). These public guarantee instruments, although 
differing in their characterizing features across nations (i.e. percentage of guaranteed coverage, lending 
criteria, industry and geographical limitations, loss distribution policy), share the common aim of reducing 
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the barriers to additional finance for borrowers that mostly suffer from credit constraints (Cowling and 
Siepel, 2013)1.  
To the best of our knowledge no empirical works have investigated, in the context of publicly 
guaranteed schemes, the dynamics of loan pricing and loan default when borrowers are high-tech firms. 
In particular, we are not aware of any study examining to what extent small high-tech firms face higher 
default rates and a greater cost premium for the use of debt finance compared to their non high-tech 
peers when lending is guaranteed by government. On the one side, it is expected that banks charge a 
higher cost of capital to high-tech firms because of their higher risk, uncertain returns, and lack of 
collateral assets. On the other hand, the presence of the public guarantee should somehow attenuate such 
“innovation debt penalty”. The paper adds to extant literature in two respects. First, it is the first study 
to investigate whether the presence of a government backed loan guarantee alters banks view in respect 
of the loan risk-premium charged to high-tech firms. Second, it differentiates from previous works in the 
field because it questions whether there is any spatial variation in both the cost of loans to high-
technology firms and in their default rates. 
In this paper we explore several key aspects of lending to technology based smaller businesses, 
using a large UK dataset of 29,266 loans issued under the Small Firm Loan Guarantee (SFLG) public 
Scheme. The scheme, established in 1981 by the UK Government, targets young and small businesses 
(up to five years old and with an annual turnover of up to £5.6 million) that lack track records or collateral 
to secure loans and has been conceived in eight distinct phases.  
Our analysis, which concentrates on the phases VI and VII of the Scheme (2000-2005), is twofold. 
Firstly, we quantify whether high-tech firms have a higher default risk than more conventional firms, and 
whether they face a double-hurdle of being small and being innovative in respect of the price premium 
they pay on their borrowing, when lending is guaranteed by government (Lee et al., 2015). Indeed, we 
                                                          
1 However, it has been found that the “credit additionality” effect induced by such schemes may not be achieved when the 
government coverage falls below a certain threshold (Boschi et al., 2014).  
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test the presence of a differential effect in terms of the loan price charged by banks for high-tech firms 
compared to their more conventional small firm peers. Secondly, we are able to trace out more nuanced 
loan price effects relating to the specific loan contract terms, the spatial location of the firms and the 
competitive, innovative and economic environment that surrounds them. In doing so we hope to build 
upon a growing body of research that has begun to unravel some key questions relating to innovation 
financing in the context of public loan guarantee programmes (see Cincero and Santos, 2015). 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Firstly, we review the literature in several related areas 
including small firm and high-technology firm financing, also in the context of guaranteed lending, and 
the effects of economic geography on the financing outcomes of smaller firms. Secondly, we discuss the 
empirical data and present the basic sample descriptive statistics. We then present our empirical modelling 
of the loan spread (our measure of the price of lending) and of loan default (our measure of loan riskiness) 
under the UK policy intervention scheme. We conclude by summarizing our findings and setting this in 
the context of previous literature. Public policy impacts and implications are also discussed given the 
centrality of publicly supported loan guarantee schemes in the small business finance arena. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 The financing of high-technology firms 
There are longstanding concerns that high-technology or innovative firms may find themselves 
credit constrained (Revest and Sapio, 2010; Ughetto, 2008; Westhead and Storey, 1997). Work in this 
area has focused on several  explanations. The most important is asymmetric information (Burgstaller, 
2013). In the classic explanation of credit constraints for small firms, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued 
that information asymmetries may cause adverse selection in credit markets making it rational for 
borrowers to restrict lending to certain types of firms, rather than raising the price of loans. In a similar 
manner to the classic ‘market for lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970), higher loan costs drive out the better quality 
applicants, lowering average quality and leading lenders to restrict financing. For innovative firms, this 
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problem of asymmetric information is mitigated by patenting, which provides an indicator of the quality 
of innovation to the lender and so reduces loan spreads (Francis et al., 2012; Plumlee et al., 2015).  
Yet three additional factors might make it costlier to lend to innovative firms and so raise bank 
margins. The first is that the expected future revenues arising from investments in scientific and 
technological research are uncertain. Secondly, an evaluation of the quality and strength of intellectual 
property rights is expensive and often requires specialist expertise, thus adding to the per unit cost of 
lending. To some degree, the second is the related challenge of raising collateral. Intangible assets such 
as new products are hard to value and so difficult to use as collateral (Mina et al., 2013). The third is the 
reluctance of innovative firms to reveal information to the market for valuation and so forced to rely on 
internal finance (Magri, 2009). These factors raise screening costs for lenders, making it hard to overcome 
the information problems identified by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
A second explanation is the idiosyncratic nature of risk in the development of new, innovative 
products (Mina et al., 2013). By their nature, investments in R&D, new products or processes are risky 
activities – while some such investments will pay off, the majority yield relatively little return (Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002; Coad and Rao, 2008; Hall, 2002). Moreover, high-technology firms may be seeking 
finance for R&D which is more speculative still (Westhead and Storey, 1997). While funders taking equity 
stakes may be interested in the long-term value of the company, banks are principally interested in the 
simple ability of lenders to repay and benefit little beyond the repayment of a loan if a product is highly 
successful.  
Empirical work has shown a strong link between banking and technological progress. For 
example, Amore et al. (2013) show that the deregulation and greater banking competition is associated 
with increased innovation. Similarly, Hsu et al. (2015) use patenting data to show that firms which have 
a strong patent portfolio pay lower spreads. However, these studies tend to focus on patenting – an 
output measure of innovation, which reflects investments in research and development (R&D) which 
have already been made. In contrast, firm level studies considering firms involved in regular innovative 
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activity often show that innovative firms are more credit constrained. Both Freel (2007) and Lee et al. 
(2015) find that innovative small firms are more likely to be rejected when applying for bank loans. The 
precise indicator of innovation seems to matter. But while several studies have considered alternative 
types of innovation, relatively few studies have considered high-technology firms explicitly. This is 
important as the link between the firm and the industry is more closely aligned in respect of high-
technology, and this in turn more closely maps into the way banks make lending allocation decisions. 
While the categorization of firms into high-tech and low-tech may cast some firm-level heterogeneity in 
innovation and R&D propensities, it has been established that banks make annual strategic lending 
choices at the industry sector level in terms of their broad allocation of credit (see Cowling, 2010 for the 
UK context). Capital in this sense flows to industries, not firms per se.  
2.2 Geographical context and financing high-technology firms 
Despite this evidence base, relatively fewer studies have considered regional variation in these 
patterns of financing. However, there is increasing interest in the idea that regional factors, such as the 
level of banking development or innovation intensity may matter for firm financing (Crocco et al., 2012; 
Munari and Toschi, 2015). Studies on IPO’s, for example, suggest that underpricing is more likely the 
further the firm is located from the financial capital (Acconcia et al., 2011). This is an important question, 
as the availability of firms to access finance is seen as an important determinant of subsequent economic 
growth – with empirical evidence suggesting finance is particularly important in deprived regions (Craig 
et al., 2008). 
One theoretical position in this area is that distance between providers of finance and potential 
borrowers may hinder exchanges of information and make it harder for firms to access the finance they 
need (Ughetto, 2009). With regard to equity finance, the classic Silicon Valley venture capitalists are 
stereotypically imagined to follow a ‘2 hour rule’ where they are unwilling to make investments beyond 
from their headquarters because doing so increases the cost of monitoring investments. Empirical work 
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does support the idea of local bias in venture capital investments, although this is particularly the case for 
younger VCs (Cumming and Dai, 2010).   
Building on a similar institutional framework, equity stakes are seen as being geographically 
limited, meaning that firms in ‘core regions’ find it easier to access finance than those in peripheral areas. 
Essentially, the clustering of investment activity in particular cities and regions may create a self-
reinforcing bias towards these areas, with both investment opportunities and specialist investors 
clustering in technologically advanced regions. These ‘thick-markets’ for specialist finance will be 
reflected in both the demand and supply of finance. Yet, this might mean that the relatively few 
investment opportunities which arise in relatively low-tech regions are actually a higher quality. In their 
study of VC investments in the US, Chen et al. (2010) show investments made outside of the core regions 
are rarer but, because they have to be higher quality, more profitable on average. 
While there is good evidence on the link between information and equity investments, fewer 
studies have considered the relationship between banks and the geography of innovative firms finance 
(Lee and Brown, 2016). One approach to explaining why banks may be less likely to lend to innovative 
firms in particular regions lies in the distinction between soft information, non-codified information 
about the firm which is hard to transmit electronically and is often developed through face to face contact, 
and hard information, such as credit records or company accounts, which can easily be transmitted from 
place to place. A simple explanation for regional variation in the financing of high technology firms is 
that persuading finance providers of the merits of innovative high-technology projects may require soft 
information, and this soft information may be locally bound. Banks focusing on high-technology 
industries may focus more on soft rather than hard information in their lending decisions. For example, 
Brown et al. (2012) show that banks do not use credit rating information to the same degree when 
evaluating lending applications from high-technology firms, although high-tech firms still face greater 
difficulties in accessing finance than low-tech firms.  
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There are several grounds for criticism of this approach. In the first place, the distinction between 
soft and hard information may not be as simple and clear-cut as portrayed (Wojcik, 2011). But it may 
also be that the structure of the banking sector in particular regions is more important than simple 
distance. For example, Alessandrini et al. (2009) suggest that the more hierarchical levels there are in a 
bank, the harder it will be to exchange soft information, and so this functional distance would matter for 
innovation as much as actual geographical distance. They show that firms in Italian regions where the 
banking system is functionally distant are less likely to introduce new innovations, with firms further 
from core banking centres financially constrained. In contrast, the regional share of big banks did not 
seem to matter. Similar evidence is presented for Austrian districts by Burgstaller (2013) who finds that 
higher bank competition is associated with lower margins, although the author does not focus on high-
technology firms specifically. 
A second set of potential explanations focus on the development of specialist spatial industries 
and markets to serve the investment and general financing requirements of high-tech firms. Classic 
explanations of innovation ecosystems show inter-related sets of financiers, entrepreneurs and other 
institutions developing together. However, in regions with few innovative firms’ these synergies may not 
operate and thin-markets for specialist finance may develop as increased search costs make it uneconomic 
for providers to operate (Nightingale et al., 2009). Reflecting this, Chen  et al. (2010) show that venture 
capitalists in the United States tend to invest in areas where past investments have been successful, and 
that the most successful investment firms tend also to be located in these core areas.   The corollary of 
this is that banks in regions with high shares of tech firms may develop specialist lending facilities, such 
as those offered by banks in high-technology clusters such as Tech City. This might mean that the share 
of high-technology firms in a region is associated with a reduced cost of borrowing, as banks become 
better at screening borrowers. 
Similarly, others have been concerned about the relationships with regional development. 
Financing of high-technology firms has a two-directional relationship with regional development, with 
availability of finance both a cause and a consequence of regional growth. While some studies have 
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considered this in the UK case, the evidence is mixed. Westhead and Storey (1997) show no evidence 
that high-technology firms in assisted areas (deprived regions) of Britain are more likely to be financially 
constrained. In contrast, Lee and Brown (2016) show that innovative companies in less affluent UK areas 
are particularly likely to report rejection rates. 
 
2.3 Loan Guarantee Schemes 
Governments in more than one hundred countries across the developed and developing world 
operate loan guarantee schemes (often called partial credit guarantee schemes, PCGs) (Beck et al., 2010). 
The pervasiveness of loan guarantee schemes as a primary instrument to promote SME lending implicitly 
assumes that there is a market failure in the provision of debt finance to SMEs, and, that by altering the 
risk-return payoff for private banks, private banks will increase their willingness to lend to informationally 
opaque and/or asset poor SMEs with viable funding proposals (Cowling, 2010; Cowling and Siepel, 2013; 
Honaghan, 2008). The key parameter in terms of changing the banks risk-return function is the coverage 
ratio, the proportion of the loan advanced by the private bank guaranteed by the government in the event 
of borrower default (Beck et al., 2010).  Across the seventy six guarantee schemes covered in the 2008 
World Bank review, the median coverage (guarantee) ratio was 80%. A later World Bank study of MENA 
countries (Saadani et al., 2011) found a slightly lower median guarantee of 75%. The guarantee level 
ensures that part of the lending risk is shared by the bank thus increasing their incentives to properly 
conduct due diligence at the point of loan application and to monitor successful loan applications, both 
of which act to reduce expected losses arising from loan default.  
The outcome evidence base is growing, but not as complete as would be required to make a 
comprehensive judgement on the generalizable efficacy of loan guarantee programmes as a policy 
instrument. Context is clearly important and the specific nature of spatial capital markets and scheme 
parameters have a decisive impact on the outcomes achieved. The first issue we concern ourselves with 
is finance additionality, or in North America incrementality. Evidence from the UK schemes found that 
scheme additionality was increasing over time as the target groups became more focused and lending 
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banks were subject to greater scrutiny. The 1999 UK evaluation (KPMG, 1999) estimated that 70% of 
loans were additional in that firms could not have accessed any market based debt finance. This increased 
to 79% in the 2010 UK evaluation (Cowling, 2010), and 82% in the 2013 UK evaluation (Allinson et al., 
2013). Comparable estimates for the Canadian scheme (Riding et al., 2007) reported a figure of 74.8% 
additionality. On job creation, the evidence that guarantee schemes can be associated with net job 
creation is fairly strong. For the US, Brown and Earle (2016) find that the net cost per job created over 
two decades was US$ 21,000 – 25,000, and that these effects were stronger for younger firms and when 
local credit conditions are weak. UK evidence found that net jobs cost averaged £5,500 - £10,000 per 
job created (Cowling, 2010) and that on average each supported firm created 0.4 jobs per annum, which 
was smaller than the later evaluation which reported 0.96 net jobs per firm per annum (Allinson et al., 
2013).  Both French (Lelarge et al., 2010) and Norwegian evidence (Poyry, Damwad, Agenda Kampang, 
2010) also supported the job creation success of guarantee schemes. On loan default, UK estimates report 
3 year loan default figures of 33.3% for SFLG and 28.0% for Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG), the 
newer scheme. The French scheme increased default by 6.2 percentage points compared to normal 
lending, and estimates for the Italian scheme suggest a 2.5% increase in default. But, importantly, the 
costs of default were not proportional to the actual default rate. UK estimates show that default cost was 
only 17.2% of total loan value which implies a net cost per recipient of only £5,000.  
 
 
3. Dataset and descriptive statistics 
 
The data we used in this study include the loans issued under the UK SFLG public loan guarantee 
scheme over the period 2000 to 2005 and were provided by the UK Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills (DBIS). Other works have previously exploited the dataset in its previous releases (see Cowling 
and Mitchell, 2003 and Cowling, 2010) and in its current form (see Cowling and Siepel, 2013 and Ughetto 
et al., 2017). The initial dataset includes 31,434 guarantee backed loans issued between 2000 and 2005 by 
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25 financial institutions in the UK (of which 80% are issued by Barclays Bank Plc, National Westminster 
Bank plc, Lloyds Bank plc, HSBC Bank Plc, i.e. the four major UK banks). 
After we dropped observations reporting missing values and outliers in the main computed 
variables, we ended up with a final sample consisting of 29,266 SFLG backed loans. To identify high-
tech firms we searched the 4 digit SIC codes for each firm and applied the Eurostat classification based 
on Rev. 2 NACE 2-digit level codes to the corresponding SIC codes. Similarly to other previous works 
(e.g. Benfratello et al., 2008; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto, 2008; Ughetto et al. 2017), high-
tech firms are those operating in the following manufacturing sectors: computer, electronic and optical 
products; chemicals and drugs; electrical equipment; mechanical machinery; transportation equipment2. 
To test the differential impact on the cost of debt and on the probability of default that loans 
issued to high-tech firms might have when different regional conditions apply, we searched for economic 
data on UK regions. The UK Competitiveness Index (year 2005), provided by the Centre for 
International Competitiveness, was used to distinguish between developed and lagging regions3. To 
measure the level of financial development of the local credit markets, we collected data on the regions’ 
number of bank branches from Eurostat-Regio (year 2003) and constructed a measure of bank branch 
density (number of branches divided by population), as it was done in previous studies (see, for instance, 
Benfratello et al., 2008; Ughetto et al., 2017). Financially developed regions have been defined as regions 
with a bank branch density higher than the median. Data on the total number of firms in the different 
SIC sectors in UK regions were extracted from the Office of National Statistics (2005). We then applied 
the Eurostat classification on High-tech industry to identify high-tech sectors and calculated the number 
of firms in the high-tech sector (as a percentage of total firm population) for each UK region to define 
technologically advanced regions. We also collected from Eurostat-Regio data on labour cost, wages and 
                                                          
2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf 
3 Such index is a composite indicator based on: 1) input factors (i.e. R&D expenditure, economic activity rates, business start-
up rates per 1,000 inhabitants, number of businesses per 1,000 inhabitants, proportion of working age population with NVQ 
level 4 or higher, proportion of knowledge based businesses), (2) output factors (i.e. value added per head at current basic 
prices, exports per head of population, imports per head of population, productivity-output per hour worked, employment 
rates) and (3) outcome factors (gross weekly pay, unemployment rates). 
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salaries and direct remuneration per hour per employee and number of firms younger than 3 years (as a 
percentage of total firm population) to identify high labor cost regions and young firm regions.  
In our empirical analysis we employ two dependent variables in the IV OLS and probit models 
respectively: (1) the spread, our measure of the price of lending, defined as the bank margin over base 
deflated by price index, and (2) the default, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan defaults and 0 
otherwise. Spreads are on average around 3.12%, although they can peak at much larger values. Out of 
29,266 loans issued, nearly 28% ended in default. The typical firm in our sample receives a loan of the 
average amount of £63,937 (but loans can reach higher amounts up to £250,000). Guarantee backed 
loans are issued mainly to cover working capital needs (56.5%). Descriptive statistics show that more 
than half of the firms’ total amount of financial debt is covered by the public guarantee (58%), although 
this percentage can rise up to a maximum of 85%. It has to be noted that the share of publicly guaranteed 
debt is fixed and determined by the policy scheme (in Phase VI, the Government coverage is 70% of the 
loan amount for firms with less than two years and 85% for older borrowers and in Phase VII it is 75%), 
so that the variation of the “guarantee coverage” is driven by the relative incidence of the guaranteed 
loan with respect to the amount of the other financial debt.4 
We also know that firms have overdraft facility outstanding in 37.1% of the cases. Firms applying 
for a guarantee backed loan are mostly micro and small-sized enterprises, reporting an average turnover 
of £0.35 million. High-tech firms represent the 10.4% of the sample. 59.8% of the firms are located in 
financially developed regions, 40.8% in developed regions, 41.4% in technologically advanced regions, 
45.4% in high labour cost regions and 49.6% in young firm regions.   
A listing of the variables used in the empirical analysis along with their definitions and their 
descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) is provided in Table 1.  
                                                          
4 In fact, the variable “guarantee coverage” is defined as the ratio between the amount of the loan covered by the public 
guarantee and the total amount of outstanding loans (included the amount of financial debt, provided by any eligible bank in 
the UK, that a firm has in addition to the guarantee-backed debt). This variable is influenced by the interplay of the policy 
initiative and the previous demand/supply for banks loans, which might reflect unobservable firm-level factors. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we first present a set of Instrumental variable (IV) OLS regressions (Table 2) in which 
the dependent variable is the spread (the adjusted loan interest rate). Instrumental variable regressions 
allow us to control for potential endogeneity problems (Wooldridge, 2002). The endogeneity problems 
attain the variable guarantee coverage, which might be affected, as it happens for the loan spread, by firm 
riskiness and other unobservable exogenous shocks. The variables start-up and turnover are used as 
instrumental variables for guarantee coverage. Table 2 reports the Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity. 
The null hypothesis is that guarantee coverage can be treated as exogenous. The Wu–Hausman test 
statistics are signiﬁcant in all model specifications, suggesting a rejection of the null of exogeneity. The 
choice of these two instrumental variables is supported by the Basmann test of overidentifying 
restrictions5. 
A more comprehensive picture of the determinants of the spread can be obtained by using 
quantile regressions (reported in the Appendix). While OLS regression focuses on the mean of the 
dependent variable, quantile regressions model the relationship between a set of regressors and the 
percentiles (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Mosteller and Tukey, 1977). In our specific case, the quantile 
regression estimates the change in a specified quantile of the spread produced by a one unit change in an 
explanatory variable. This allows us to compare how some percentiles of the spread distribution may be 
more affected by certain loan and firm characteristics more than other percentiles, a particular concern 
because of the potentially skewed distribution of risk amongst high-technology firms. To tackle the 
                                                          
5 The exogeneity condition implies that at least one instrument must be exogenous. The exogeneity of the instrument “start-
up” can be justified from a theoretical point of view, referring to the specific context of the SFLG scheme. Indeed, the variable 
start-up is negatively correlated with the variable guarantee coverage because start-ups do not usually have previous debt, but 
is unrelated to the outcome (spread). This is possible because the SFLG Scheme is financing young firms aged between 0 and 
5 years old. While it can be expected that firm age has a non negligible effect on the spread in a sample of firms characterized 
by a large variance of firm age, this is not the case with our specific sample. Indeed, it might be argued that in the specific 
SFLG Scheme context, interest rates are charged based upon other unobservable firm-related factors (e.g. such as the quality 
of the business plan). 
 
14 
 
previously mentioned endogeneity problem, we run IV quantile regressions, using a relatively new 
method and coding (i.e. ivqreg routine for Stata developed by Kwak, 2010). The variables start-up and 
turnover are used as instrumental variables for guarantee coverage. 
We then run a set of probit models to predict the probability of loan default (Table 3). High-tech is 
our main variable of interest. The aim of the analysis is to study the loan pricing conditions and the 
probability of loan default for high-tech applicants. We are also interested in identifying specific 
differential patterns when high-tech firms are located in regions with different levels of economic, 
financial and technological development and when different macro-economic conditions and types of 
lenders apply. We therefore interact the dummy variable high-tech with a number of variables identifying 
regional and economic dimensions. Independent variables include the amount of the loan covered by the 
guarantee scheme as a percentage of the total amount of outstanding loans, firm and loan characteristics. 
We also control for sectors, regions, banks and macro-economic conditions.  
Table 2 reports the econometric analysis of the determinants of the spread through IV OLS 
regressions. Model 1 illustrates the baseline specification that includes among the regressors a set of basic 
loan (i.e. guaranteed coverage, loan amount, additional loan commitments, loan purpose) and firm level 
variables (i.e. company status, high-tech). The main variable of interest for the purpose of the study is 
whether firms belong to the high-tech sector. We control for region dummies and macro-economic 
conditions (GDP growth). We then augment this specification by including interaction variables equal to 
the dummy high-tech times dummy variables on whether the loan was granted by the biggest four UK 
banks (model 2) and in recession times (model 3). The high-tech dummy variable is then interacted with 
a number of variables identifying whether loan applicants are located in economically and financially 
developed regions (models 4 and 5), technologically advanced regions (model 6), high labor cost regions 
(model 7) and regions with a large population of young firms (model 8).  
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Results in Table 2 indicate that the higher is the incidence of the publicly guaranteed debt over the 
total amount of outstanding loans, the lower is, on average, the spread6. Higher margins are charged for 
loans issued for working capital purposes and in periods of economic growth. Higher rates are also 
applied for limited partnerships/companies and by the biggest four UK banks, although this effect loses 
statistical significance in models 5 and 7.  
High-tech firms are charged, on average, higher rates on loans. This result is significant at 1% 
level of statistical significance in all model specifications. This is in line with the expectation that high-
tech firms face a greater cost premium for the use of external finance because of their limited availability 
of collateral to secure firms’ borrowing and the high degree of risk which characterizes the returns of 
R&D investments.  
We find evidence that the public loan guarantee scheme is successful in reducing the cost of debt 
for firms located in economic and financially developed regions, technologically developed, high labor 
costs and young firm regions. In these regions loan applicants are charged, on average, lower spreads. It 
is in fact plausible that more creditworthy firms populate these areas because of the greater opportunities 
they receive in terms of access to credit, infrastructures and business networks, leading banks to apply 
lower margins on their loans. However, it is also the case that closer proximity to small business 
customers lowers information asymmetries. In addition, there is the potential for financial institutions in 
more developed financial markets to invest more in information processing systems to support lending. 
Finally, there is a more textbook competition effect on prices in that greater competition for loans from 
the supply side reduces prices in the market. 
                                                          
6 In a previous work (Ughetto et al., 2017), we investigated for which type of borrowers and loans does the public guarantee 
generate a more favorable effect (in terms of reduction in the cost of capital). We found that an increase of the incidence of 
the debt guaranteed by government with respect to the total outstanding debt leads to a contraction in the spread only for 
loans covering working capital needs rather than investments. However, we did not find any differential impact when the 
sample is split according to whether borrowers belong to high-tech or low-tech manufacturing sectors and to knowledge-
intensive or less knowledge-intensive service sectors. 
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From a public policy perspective, it is interesting to examine whether differential patterns on the 
spread charged to high-tech firms differ by regional and economic context. We find positive and 
significant coefficients for the interactions between the variable high-tech and the binary variables 
identifying the regions characterized by high levels of labor cost (model 7) and economic development 
(model 4) and technological advances (model 6). Hence, the impact on the spread for firms belonging to 
the high-tech sector is larger if they are located in high labor cost, technologically advanced and developed 
regions7. The interaction effect is not significant when high-tech firms receive their loans from the biggest 
4 UK banks and when they are located in financially developed regions or in regions with a large 
population of young firms. Results also indicate that lower margins are applied in states of a bad economy 
and that this holds true for high-tech firms.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
The IV quantile regression results in Table 1A show that the IV OLS estimates do not tell the 
whole story. The value of the estimated coefficients for the variable high-tech seems to vary over the 
spread distribution, with the highest coefficients at the median (50th percentile). When interactions are 
considered, the negative association between the spread and the interaction variable high-tech*recession 
is significant at both 25th and 50th percentiles, but it is not significant at the 75th percentile. The impact on 
the spread for high-tech firms located in developed regions is larger for higher percentiles of the spread 
(75th percentiles). A positive and significant correlation between the spread and the interaction variable 
high-tech*high-tech region is only found at the 75th percentile. At all percentiles the variable ‘high-tech * 
high labor cost region displays a positive and statistically significant effect on the spread, showing a bigger 
effect in the 50th and 75th percentiles. The coefficients for loans issued to cover working capital needs 
                                                          
7 We also experimented with alternative variables concerning the technological development of a region, such as if the firm is 
located in a region with total R&D personnel in head count in percentage of active population greater than the sample median 
and in a region with employment in technology and knowledge intensive sectors greater than the sample median. Results are 
in line with those reported in Model 6 of Table 2. 
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and for guaranteed coverage are larger at the 75th percentiles, and the latter is not significant at the lowest 
quantiles. 
In Table 3 we run a simple probit model on the probability that the loan ends in default. 
Understanding what drives default and what is the probability that loans received by high-tech firms end 
in default and how this varies when different time and local conditions apply is crucial for an assessment 
of the cost to government of running the scheme. The default rate for the total population of SFLG 
loans over the period 2000-2005 is 28% and this percentage rises to 36% for the sub-sample of high-tech 
firms. The dependent variable of the probit model is default, which is a binary outcome coded 1 if the 
loan ended in default and zero otherwise. Independent variables are the same reported in previous IV 
OLS regressions.  
We observe that firms with higher turnover show, on average, lower default rates. Loans used for 
working capital purposes on average have higher default rates, and this effect is significant at 1% level. 
The increase in the likelihood of default due to marginal increases in the variable loan wc is approximately 
9.8%. In contrast, no relationship is found between loan amount and default. The relationship between 
the guarantee coverage and subsequent default is not statistically significant. As expected, in recessionary 
times the probability of default is greater than in good states of the economy. Interestingly, firms located 
in economically developed, technologically advanced and young firm regions are more likely to default, 
while firms located in financially advanced regions are the least likely to default.  
The key finding from the default model is that there is a positive relationship between high-tech 
applicants and subsequent default. This result is significant at 1% level and robust in almost all model 
specifications (with the exception of model 7). Being a high-tech firm increases the default probability by 
approximately 5%, depending on the considered model (from the lowest 3% to the highest 7%). 
Interaction effects in the probit model show a negative and significant correlation with the default 
probability for the interacted variables high-tech*big4, high-tech* developed region, high-tech* high-tech 
region and high-tech*young firm region, while high-tech* financially developed region displays a positive 
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and significant correlation with the dependent variable. Looking at the magnitude of the interaction 
effects8, it emerges that high-tech firms are 3.7% more likely to default if the loan is not provided by the 
biggest four banks. Instead, loans provided to high-tech firms from one of the four biggest UK banks 
have a comparatively lower probability to default (even if, on average, such loans are associated with 
higher default rates). In fact, the probability of default decreases by 1.2% when high-tech firms are 
financed by the major four UK banks. This effect is significant at 5% significance level. For high tech 
firms belonging to financially developed regions the probability of default is 10.6% higher, while firms 
not belonging to a financial developed region are 7.3% more likely to default (at 1% level of statistical 
significance). It also emerges that high-tech firms operating in economically advanced and young firm 
regions are 1.2% more likely to default, but this effect is not statistically significant. The likelihood of 
default decreases by 0.8% for firms operating in high-tech regions but again this effect is not statistically 
significant. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have explored in depth several key questions relating to small business lending in the context 
of high-technology firms under a prominent UK publicly guaranteed scheme. In particular, we 
questioned; (a) whether  high-technology firms are a greater lending risk, (b) whether  technology firms 
face an additional loan price premium over and above that relating to their smallness (the innovation 
penalty), (c) whether the presence of a government backed loan guarantee alters banks view in respect of 
their loan risk-premium, (d) whether spatial location of the firm in the context of the specific regional 
economic, innovation, and competitive position alters the way banks price lending to technology firms. 
                                                          
8 As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003) the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the 
marginal effect of the interaction term.  
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Firstly, we found clear evidence that high-technology firms present a higher default risk to banks 
with loan default being observably higher than that of conventional firms. But the difference in predicted 
loan default probabilities for high-technology firms was not particularly large, suggesting that they are 
not as risky as might be commonly perceived. In relation to the price of lending, our core finding was 
that there is evidence of an ‘innovation premium’ on lending to high-technology firms. But this was only 
in the region of 0.5-0.6% which suggests that the actual magnitude of the ‘innovation premium’ is not 
particularly large in the presence of a substantial guarantee coverage rate. Further, it was the case that the 
provision of the public loan guarantee lowered interest spreads significantly for all firms. 
In general, we found that banks penalize short-term lending, particularly for working capital. This 
suggests that cash-flow problems and the inability to self-finance working capital from retained earnings 
is viewed as a poor signal by lending banks. In periods of economic growth, banks also appear to take 
advantage of firms relative lack of price sensitivity and charge higher loan rates. In line with what standard 
economic models of imperfect markets predict, the big-4 UK banks lend at higher rates than their smaller 
counterparts. When combined with their ability to raise cheap capital on international markets, and their 
ability to extract surplus profits from non-lending related activities from customer firms, small firm 
lending for bigger banks is likely to be substantially more profitable. 
We found evidence of spatial variation in both the cost of loans to high-technology firms and 
their default rates, although our evidence is relatively nuanced. At a general level, lending is cheaper in 
economically developed regions, in regions with highly developed financial markets, in regions where 
there is a significant high-technology cluster and presence, and in regions characterized by a young and 
dynamic business sector. But these benefits are not shared equally across all firms. In particular, high-
tech firms still face a debt penalty in economically developed regions, in technologically advanced regions 
and in high wage (labor cost) regions. This might suggest that when banks have a large demand for loans 
from conventional, lower-risk, firms, then the need to expand their lending to high-tech firms incurs a 
penalty, even when the regional economy is buoyant and technologically fervent.  
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However, it was also interesting to note that high-tech firms faced no penalty in regions with 
well-developed financial markets. This suggests competition on the supply-side of the loan market drives 
general debt prices downwards. In short, when a firm has many alternatives when seeking finance, banks 
react by lowering their price to be more attractive to potential borrowers.  
The study has some clear limitations, which mainly involve the typology of data at disposal. First, 
we cannot control for the economic and financial standing of our sample firms, because they are to a 
large extent small and young companies that in the UK are exempt, by law, from full financial reporting. 
We made such check with the FAME dataset and found just a small number of them. Another limitation 
relates to the lack of information on the seniority of the credit lines, which would have allowed further 
refinements of the analysis.  
Focusing on the public policy implications of our findings, our data reveal that, on average, high-
tech firms still face a modest innovation debt penalty even when lending in the context of a policy 
measure that should, in principle, lower the cost of lending to firms facing significant financing gaps. 
What is clear is that high-tech firms are not treated the same as their more conventional peers when 
lending and this general feature can be exacerbated by spatial differences in economics, innovation, and 
competitiveness. 
In terms of identifying some practical implications for policy-makers, banks, and technology 
entrepreneurs, our evidence suggests some areas for consideration and development. For policy-makers, 
there is an interesting tension between the provision of a standardized national loan guarantee scheme 
which is well understood by all market participants and a more segmented approach to the design of 
schemes which takes greater account of the more specific aspects of financing particularly types of firms 
and local economic and financial systems. But this latter approach would add complexity at the 
operational level and risks creating small, less effective, sub-national funds (Nightingale et al., 2009). For 
banks, our evidence suggests an implication that has great relevance to their general lending processes 
and in terms of administering a loan guarantee scheme. It would appear that larger banks, those with 
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more sophisticated loan processing systems, are better able to price loans according to true risk, and this 
feature is enhanced when they are operating in more sophisticated, and competitive, financial markets. 
But this must be considered against the overall firm environment in which high-tech firms are only 
moderately more of a default risk than more conventional firms. For entrepreneurs, a better 
understanding of how banks price loans might support better prepared loan applications, particularly 
when there is an opportunity to offer soft, as well as hard information to potential financiers. 
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Table 1-Descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) and definitions of the variables used 
in the empirical analysis 
 Definition Mean Median SD 
spread Bank margin over base deflated by price index 3.126 2.6 2.087   
default A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan defaults and 0 otherwise 0.280 0 0.265 
guarantee coverage Ratio between the amount of the loan covered by the guarantee 
scheme and the total amount of outstanding loans (in £) 
0.580 0.7 0.229 
overdraft A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has additional overdraft 
outstanding and 0 otherwise 
0.371 0 0.483 
loan wc A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is issued to cover working 
capital needs and 0 otherwise 
0.565 1 0.495 
loan amount Loan amount (in million £) 0.063 0.05 0.052 
limited A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a limited 
partnerhip/company and 0 otherwise 
0.709 1 0.454 
turnover Firm’s turnover (in million £) 0.345 0.14 0.505 
start-up A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a start-up and 0 otherwise  0.295 0 0.456 
high-tech A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the high-tech sector 
(SIC classification) and 0 otherwise 
0.104 0 0.305   
big4 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s main loan is issued by one of 
the four major UK clearing banks and 0 otherwise 
0.801 1 0.399 
GDP growth Quarterly GDP growth 0.597 0.54 0.269 
recession A dummy variable equal to 1 if the economy is in recession and 0 
otherwise 
0.203 0 0.402 
developed region A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in a developed 
region (with a UK competitiveness Index higher than the median) and 
0 otherwise 
0.408 0 0.491   
financially developed 
region 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in a financially 
developed region (with a bank branch density higher than the median) 
and 0 otherwise 
0.598 1 0.490 
high-tech region A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in a region with a 
number of firms in the high-tech sectors as a percentage of total firm 
population greater than the sample median and 0 otherwise 
0.414 0 0.492 
high labour cost 
region 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in a region with 
labour cost, wages and salaries and direct remuneration per hour per 
employee greater than the sample median and 0 otherwise 
0.454 0 0.497 
young firm region A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in a region with a 
number of firms younger than 3 years as a percentage of total firm 
population greater than the sample median and 0 otherwise 
0.496 0 0.499 
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Table 2. Instrumental variable (IV) OLS regressions. Dependent variable: spread 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
guarantee coverage -3.073** -3.071** -3.320** -3.140** -3.227** -3.016** -3.195** -3.197** 
 (1.316) (1.325) (1.359) (1.321) (1.307) (1.311) (1.306) (1.314) 
limited 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
overdraft -0.176 -0.176 -0.164 -0.185 -0.196 -0.170 -0.192 -0.193 
 (0.178) (0.179) (0.185) (0.179) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) 
loan wc 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.322*** 0.339*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
loan amount -0.027 -0.026 -0.387 -0.139 -0.127 -0.152 -0.149 -0.100 
 (0.910) (0.914) (0.947) (0.929) (0.926) (0.922) (0.924) (0.925) 
high-tech 0.548*** 0.521*** 0.654*** 0.482*** 0.504*** 0.476*** 0.447*** 0.505*** 
 (0.044) (0.082) (0.050) (0.054) (0.070) (0.053) (0.062) (0.059) 
growth_GDP 2.160*** 2.160***  2.161*** 2.161*** 2.163*** 2.161*** 2.160*** 
 (0.052) (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
big4 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.134*** 0.057* 0.021 0.071** 0.024 0.066** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
high-tech*big4  0.036       
  (0.099)       
recession   -0.731***      
   (0.033)      
high-tech*recession   -0.278***      
   (0.099)      
developed region    -0.098***     
    (0.029)     
high-tech*developed region    0.161**     
    (0.081)     
financially developed region     -0.070***    
     (0.027)    
high-tech*financially developed region     0.069    
     (0.083)    
high-tech region      -0.170***   
      (0.028)   
high-tech*high-tech region      0.179**   
      (0.082)   
high labour cost region       -0.063**  
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       (0.026)  
high-tech*high labour cost region       0.202**  
       (0.080)  
young firm region        -0.099*** 
        (0.028) 
high-tech*young firm region        0.086 
        (0.079) 
Region dummies yes yes no no no no no no 
         
Constant 3.600*** 3.602*** 5.161*** 3.367*** 3.449*** 3.310*** 3.415*** 3.403*** 
 (0.823) (0.825) (0.834) (0.775) (0.765) (0.768) (0.767) (0.771) 
         
Observations 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 
Wald chi2 3416.08*** 3417.88*** 3287.65*** 3281.94*** 3251.07*** 3340.23*** 3256.55*** 3269.85*** 
Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity 4.660** 4.586** 4.983** 4.823** 5.259** 4.449** 5.132** 5.095** 
Basmann test of overidentifying restrictions 1.909 1.926 1.118 1.784 1.494 2.175 1.596 1.716 
Note: The Table reports the Instrumental variable OLS regressions to test the determinants of the spread. Instrumented: guarantee coverage. The variables start-up and turnover are used 
as instrumental variables for guarantee coverage. The definitions of the independent variables are provided in Table 1. For the sake of synthesis, we omit estimated coefficients for region 
dummies. The Table reports Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity and Basmann test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10 
 
  
Table 3. Probit model. Dependent variable: loan default (coefficients reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
         
guarantee coverage 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.048 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
overdraft -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
loan wc 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.302*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
loan amount 0.052 0.048 0.041 0.052 0.035 0.065 0.067 0.033 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.175) (0.176) 
turnover -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.190*** -0.187*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
high-tech 0.093*** 0.111*** 0.150*** 0.163*** 0.214*** 0.132*** 0.033 0.154*** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.052) (0.036) (0.041) (0.036) 
big4 0.046* 0.045* 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.066** 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.066*** 
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 (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
high-tech*big4     -0.158***    
     (0.059)    
recession  0.102***       
  (0.023)       
high-tech*recession  -0.087       
  (0.061)       
developed_region   0.047***      
   (0.018)      
high-tech* developed region   -0.140***      
   (0.051)      
financially developed region       -0.037**  
       (0.017)  
high-tech* financially developed region       0.097*  
       (0.052)  
high-tech region    0.037**     
    (0.018)     
high-tech* high-tech region    -0.166***     
    (0.051)     
high labor cost region      0.021   
      (0.017)   
high-tech* high labor cost region      -0.081   
      (0.050)   
young firm region        0.060*** 
        (0.018) 
high-tech*young firm region        -0.126** 
        (0.050) 
Constant -1.515*** -1.539*** -1.303*** -1.303*** -1.536*** -1.302*** -1.261*** -1.308*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.039) (0.039) (0.104) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) 
         
Observations 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 
Pseudo R-squared 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
Note: The Table reports the probit models to test the probability of loan default (coefficients reported). The definitions of the independent variables are provided in Table 1. For the sake 
of synthesis, we omit estimated coefficients for region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix 
Table 1A (panel a). IV Quantile regressions. Dependent variable: spread 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 25perc 50perc 75perc 25perc 50perc 75perc 25perc 50perc 75perc 
          
guarantee coverage 1.069 -4.486*** -6.831*** 2.245*** -5.809*** -8.418*** 0.735 -3.562** -8.384*** 
 (1.047) (1.554) (2.436) (1.676) (1.586) (2.207) (0.863) (1.496) (2.315) 
overdraft 0.229 -0.320 -0.470 0.425** -0.371* -0.673** 0.176 -0.180 -0.676** 
 (0.141) (0.210) (0.330) (0.226) (0.215) (0.300) (0.116) (0. 202) (0.313) 
loan wc 0.137*** 0.410*** 0.622*** 0.128*** 0.438*** 0.599*** 0.113*** 0.424*** 0.651*** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.048) (0.021) (0.031) (0.044) (0.016) (0.029) (0.046) 
loan amount -1.487** 0.683 1.432 -2.497*** 0. 994 1.711 -1.194** -0.171 2.091 
 (0.723) (1.071) (1.667) (1.142) (1.105) (1.525) (0.606) (1.052) (1.615) 
limited 0.046** 0.213*** 0.296*** 0.013 0.239*** 0.360*** 0.038** 0.222*** 0.324*** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.056) (0.027) (0.036) (0.051) (0.019) (0.034) (0.053) 
high-tech 0.508*** 0.805*** 0.546*** 0.732*** 0.946*** 0.611*** 0.418*** 0.793*** 0.515*** 
 (0.063) (0.096) (0.151) (0.040) (0.057) (0.081) (0.034) (0.061) (0.095) 
growth_GDP 2.301*** 2.465*** 2.041***    2.300*** 2.479*** 1.991*** 
 (0.038) (0.060) (0.093)    (0.032) (0.058) (0.088) 
big4 0.043 0.180*** 0.359*** -0.007 0.074 0.341*** -0.024 0.053 0.117** 
 (0.032) (0.048) (0.075) (0.034) (0.048) (0.066) (0.021) (0.037) (0.057) 
high-tech*big4 -0.004 0.019 0.150       
 (0.076) (0.115) (0.181)       
recession    -0.491*** -0.639*** -1.042***    
    (0.024) (0.038) (0.053)    
high-tech*recession    -0.508*** -0.305*** -0.150    
    (0.075) (0.115) (0.163)    
developed region       -0.042** -0.104** -0.176*** 
       (0.018) (0.033) (0.051) 
high-tech*developed region       0.084* 0.166** 0.301** 
       (0.051) (0.091) (0.141) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
Constant -0.460 3.327*** 6.261*** 0.323 5.782*** 8.803*** -0.215  2.867*** 7.423*** 
 (0.618) (0.918) (1.442) (0.971) (0.921) (1.283) (0.506) (0.877) (1.359) 
Observations 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 
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Table 1A(panel b). IV Quantile regressions. Dependent variable: spread 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 25perc 50perc 75perc 25perc 50perc 75perc 25perc 50perc 75perc 25perc 50perc 75perc 
             
guaranteed_coverage 0.862 -3.880** -8.307*** 0.725 -4.397*** -7.674*** 0.508 -4.034*** -8.405*** 0.687 -3.908*** -8.629*** 
 (0.854) (1.535) (2.410) (0.851) (1.401) (2.310) (0.921) (1.525) (2.279) (0.826) (1.407) (2.277) 
overdraft 0.193* -0.220 -0.675** 0.177 -0.299 -0.574** 0.145 -0.241 -0.667** 0.169 -0.231 -0.702** 
 (0.115) (0.207) (0.326) (0.114) (0.189) (0.312) (0.124) (0.206) (0.308) (0.111) (0.190) (0.308) 
loan wc 0.114*** 0.428*** 0.640*** 0.117*** 0.421*** 0.657*** 0.108*** 0.428*** 0.652*** 0.113*** 0.428*** 0.648*** 
 (0.016) (0.030) (0.048) (0.016) (0.027) (0.046) (0.018) (0.030) (0.046) (0.016) (0.028) (0.045) 
loan amount -1.358** 0.092 1.877 -1.195** 0.378 1.639 -1.028 0.191 1.953 -1.170** 0.131 2.229 
 (0.604) (1.087) (1.693) (0.598) (0.986) (1.613) (0.651) (1.078) (1.599) (0.582) (0.991) (1.591) 
limited 0.036** 0.224*** 0.341*** 0.042** 0.219*** 0.338*** 0.039** 0.224*** 0.335*** 0.037** 0.220*** 0.334*** 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.056) (0.019) (0.032) (0.054) (0.021) (0.035) (0.053) (0.019) (0.032) (0.053) 
high-tech 0.533*** 0.709*** 0.460*** 0.477*** 0.792*** 0.470*** 0.415*** 0.670*** 0.474*** 0.486*** 0.820*** 0.550*** 
 (0.045) (0.082) (0.130) (0.034) (0.057) (0.095) (0.042) (0.072) (0.108) (0.036) (0.063) (0.102) 
growth_GDP 2.302*** 2.488*** 1.983*** 2.293*** 2.451*** 2.003*** 2.303*** 2.467*** 1.988*** 2.300*** 2.463*** 1.994*** 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.093) (0.032) (0.055) (0.089) (0.035) (0.060) (0.088) (0.031) (0.055) (0.088) 
big4 -0.047** 0.027 0.051 -0.017 0.075** 0.150*** -0.035 0.027 0.068 -0.019 0.074** 0.123** 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.062) (0.021) (0.035) (0.057) (0.023) (0.039) (0.059) (0.020) (0.035) (0.057) 
financially developed region -0.038** -0.087*** -0.155***          
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.049)          
high-tech*financially developed 
region 
-0.037 0.245** 0.270*          
 (0.053) (0.097) (0.154)          
high-tech region    -0.068*** -0.175*** -0. 346***       
    (0.018) (0.030) (0.050)       
high-tech*high-tech region    0.079 0.130 0. 436***       
    (0.052) (0.087) (0.145)       
high labor cost region       -0.009 -0.079*** -0.145***    
       (0.018) (0.030) (0.045)    
high-tech*high labor cost region       0.182*** 0.341*** 0.336***    
       (0.055) (0.093) (0.140)    
young firm region          -0.046*** -0.113*** -0.152*** 
          (0.017) (0.030) (0.049) 
high-tech*young firm region          0.067 0.060 0.153 
          (0.049) (0.084) (0.137) 
Constant -0.260 3.068*** 7.463*** -0.203 3.399*** 7.020*** -0.088 3.155*** 7.463*** -0.184 3.073*** 7.558*** 
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 (0.500) (0.899) (1.412) (0.498) (0.821) (1.355) (0.540) (0.895) (1.339) (0.484) (0.825) (1.337) 
             
Observations 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 29,266 
Note: The Table reports the IV quantile regressions (25 perc, 50 perc, 75 perc) to test the determinants of the spread. IV quantile regressions are run using the Stata ivqreg routine 
developed by Do Won Kwak (2010). Instrumented: guarantee coverage. The variables start-up and turnover are used as instrumental variables for guarantee coverage. The definitions of 
the independent variables are provided in Table 1. For the sake of synthesis, we omit estimated coefficients for region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2A. Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
guarantee coverage (1) 1            
overdraft (2) 0.0714 1           
loan wc (3) 0.0947 0.022 1          
loan amount (4) -0.0596 -0.0075 -0.0131 1         
limited (5) 0.0137 0.0067 -0.1022 0.1939 1        
big4 (6) -0.0062 -0.0042 -0.0113 -0.1148 0.018 1       
growth GDP (7) 0.2922 0.041 -0.0022 -0.0432 0.0013 -0.0347 1      
hightech (8) 0.1005 0.0351 0.1275 0.0769 0.0317 -0.0365 0.0182 1     
recession (9) -0.147 -0.0038 -0.004 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0166 -0.5421 0.0089 1    
high labour cost region (10) -0.0156 -0.016 0.0038 0.0524 -0.0038 -0.2053 -0.0129 0.0401 0.005 1   
young firm region (11) -0.0358 -0.0094 -0.0226 0.0196 0.0025 0.2856 -0.0258 0 0.0066 0.4314 1  
high-tech region (12) -0.0486 -0.0125 -0.0208 0.0629 0.011 0.2079 -0.0218 0.015 0.0063 0.5896 0.5151 1 
financially developed region (13) -0.0219 -0.0076 -0.0045 0.0251 0.0138 -0.1737 -0.0126 0.0165 0.007 0.3536 -0.2466 -0.0468 
developed region (14) -0.0354 -0.012 -0.0242 0.0371 0.0149 0.2422 -0.0286 0.0072 0.0076 0.6021 0.8369 0.6747 
 
